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Advertising and endogenous
exit in a differentiated duopoly
Andrea Mantovani∗
Giordano Mion∗
CORE, Universite´ Catholique de Louvain and
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy∗∗
1 Introduction
The role of advertising in the competition among ﬁrms has always repre-
sented an interesting issue that has been studied following the diﬀerent
aspects of its nature. Advertising is informative when its function is to
provide information about the availability of a certain product/brand and
its characteristics. But advertising has also a persuasive content, when the
investing ﬁrm aims at convincing customers that what they really want is
its particular variety, thus increasing product diﬀerentiation. Butters (1977),
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Schmalensee (1978) deal with advertising
that carries basic product information, while Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
and Nelson (1974) focus on information as a signal of quality. The issue of
persuasive advertising is instead discussed in Dixit and Norman (1978) and
von der Fehr and Stevik (1998).
Moreover, advertising could give rise to barriers to entry for newco-
mers that would need to spend a substantial amount of money to overcome
the reputation of the incumbents. Many authors focused on the issue of
strategic advertising as an instrument to deter entry (Bagwell and Ramey,
1988 and 1990). Schmalensee (1983) considered a duopoly two-stage Cour-
∗ We thank Rabah Amir, Claude d’Aspremont, Luca Lambertini, Jacques Thisse, Vincent Vannetelbosch,
Xavier Wauthy as well as two ananymous referees for useful comments and suggestions. We are also
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Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from CORE. The usual disclaimer applies.
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not model where an initial investment in advertising was able to deter the
entry of new rivals. More recently, Ishigaki (2000) found that Schmalensee’s
results did not hold in a similar Bertrand setting.
In this paper we consider a two stage model of duopolistic competition
with horizontally diﬀerentiated goods. Firms ﬁrst decide whether to invest
in advertising or not and then compete in the market by setting prices.
We deal with advertising that shifts demand curves, and in particular we
focus on two eﬀects, namely the market enlargement of a “non well-known”
product and the predatory interaction that arises in advertising games.
The ﬁrst eﬀect comes from the consideration that consumers might not
be fully aware of the presence of certain types of products in the market.
A ﬁrm that develops a “novelty” must invest resources to explain which
kind of product has become available. The creation of a new market, or the
enlargement of an existing one, could represent nonetheless an advantage
for a potential rival, that would beneﬁt from an information spill-over that
shifts the demand curve upward for all those kinds of goods. The overall
eﬀect, that we call “market enlargement eﬀect”, provides an advantage to
all ﬁrms as sellers of that type of product. This case is particularly suited to
describe informative advertising for search goods like new hi-tech products.
A good example can be traced in the DVD market expansion boosted by
Sony’s massive advertising campaign.
The second eﬀect is related to the conventional view that advertising
creates “brand loyalty” and “goodwill” that stick to a determined brand
(Kaldor, 1950). In fact, by engaging in advertising, a ﬁrm increases its own
demand while at the same time it reduces the demand of the rival, giving
rise to what we call “stealing eﬀect”. An example is given by the use of
comparative advertising, through which a ﬁrm compares the characteristics
of its product with those of the competitors.1
We depart from the standard assumption that advertising is either
cooperative or predatory (see Friedman, (1983); Martin, (2002)). In the li-
terature, in fact, advertising is deﬁned as cooperative when it shifts the
demand curve for the product at large, thus creating a beneﬁt for all ﬁrms
in an industry. It is deﬁned as predatory when a ﬁrm’s advertising shifts
its own demand curve at the expenses of the rivals. A very simple way to
represent such a distinction is to adopt a unique parameter that, depending
on the sign, determines which eﬀect is at stake.
By contrast, we analyse situations where advertising has both coopera-
tive and predatory features by modeling simultaneously the market enlarg-
ment and the stealing eﬀect.2 As we will see, the relative strength of these
two components determine the outcome of the game in such a rich way that
1 The use of comparative advertising progressively increased both in the United States and, more recently,
also in the European Union. According to Muehling et al. (1990), in the United States around 40% of all
advertising is comparative.
2 For an alternative (dynamic) framework in which advertising is both cooperative and predatory, see Piga
(1998).
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Andrea Mantovani, Giordano Mion 21
cannot be reduced to a single parameter story. Depending on particular va-
lues, both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria could arise. Among them,
two outcomes are of particular interest : (i) a coordination game, in which
both ﬁrms deciding to invest and both deciding not to invest are simulta-
neously equilibria of the game; (ii) a chicken game, in which only one ﬁrm
invests in equilibrium with the second one possibly driven (endogenously)
out of the market. Furthermore, we provide some insight about the Pareto
optimality (from ﬁrms’ standpoint) of market outcomes that will enable us
to identify prisoner dilemma situations.
In our setting, particular attention will be paid to the role of product
diﬀerentiation in determining the equilibrium level of advertising, as well
as to shed some light on the problem of coordination. Crucially, and that
is why we decided to deal with both price competition and diﬀerentiation,
the degree of product substitutability has a direct impact on advertising
decisions, and in particular on the capability to steal market shares from
rivals, that could not be easily modeled in the standard quantity compe-
tition framework. In some settings, the degree of product diﬀerentiation is
aﬀected by the advertising strategy. However, it is reasonable to think that
each market has some “predeterminated” degree of product substitutabi-
lity that inﬂuence ﬁrms decisions and in particular the advertising eﬀort.
Furthermore, price competition is a more natural assumption in a market
where products are diﬀerentiated. Grossman and Shapiro (1984), for exam-
ple, consider a diﬀerentiation duopoly model with price competition and
show that advertising is positively related to the degree of product diﬀe-
rentiation. Other advertising models dealing with these two features can
be found in Butters (1977), Wolinsky (1984) and von der Fehr and Stevik
(1998). In our framework we will see that (by taking into account asym-
metric outcomes), the relation between the equilibrium level of advertising
and the degree of product diﬀerentiation is not as simple.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following
section we will introduce the analytic features of the model. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the second stage price game while in Section 4 we solve (backward)
the ﬁrst stage advertising game. Section 5 provides a complete characteri-
zation of the equilibria of the game in terms of parameters and then turns
to their economic interpretation. Section 6 ﬁnally provides conclusions and
directions for further research.
2 The Model
Consider an industry composed of two a priori identical ﬁrms that produce
a diﬀerentiated good. They are engaged in the following two-stage game. In
the ﬁrst stage, each ﬁrm decides the resources to be invested in advertising,
while in the second stage they compete in prices. We further assume that
ﬁrms can only decide to advertise or not, incurring a ﬁxed cost that we
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
LS
E 
-  
 - 
15
8.
14
3.
19
7.
75
 - 
22
/0
5/
20
12
 1
0h
57
. ©
 D
e 
Bo
ec
k 
Un
ive
rs
ité
 
D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - LSE -   - 158.143.197.75 - 22/05/2012 10h57. © De Boeck Université   
22 Recherches Économiques de Louvain – Louvain Economic Review 72(1), 2006
normalize to one, while the strategy set of each ﬁrm for the second stage
price game is the entire ℜ+. As for the solution of the game, we restrict our
attention to subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Ideally, it would be preferable to use a more sophisticated set of al-
ternatives for advertising decisions. However, as some other types of invest-
ments, advertising has a discrete nature in the sense that it is sometimes
more important to decide whether to invest or not rather than the exact
amount to be spent on it. Indeed, as pointed out is Sutton (1991), adverti-
sing belongs to those “endogenous” sunk costs that determine the strategic
features of a market. Furthermore, as we will see afterwards, our simple
binary assumption will allow for a complete characterization of all possible
equilibria of the game.
In order to keep things as simple as possible, marginal costs are sup-
posed to be zero and there are no ﬁxed costs in production. The demand
structure turns out to be extremely important in our analysis. As we want
to deal with both product diﬀerentiation and price competition, a natural
starting point is the linear demand function : 3
qi = a− bpi + c (p−i − pi) = a− (b+ c) pi + c p−i (1)
where a stands for market size and b represents the surplus of the own
price over the cross price eﬀect. The parameter c is an (inverse) measure of
product diﬀerentiation; the higher c, the higher the substitutability between
the products, given the stronger impact of a price diﬀerence.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the kind of advertising we are
interested in gives rise simultaneously to two separate eﬀects. First, de-
mand curves shift outward, thus enlarging the market for the product at
large. The market enlargement eﬀect is then modeled through a symmetric
shift of the parameter a in the demand function of the two ﬁrms. Secondly,
by doing advertising, each ﬁrm creates “brand loyalty” and “goodwill” for
its own product, thus drawing consumers away from rivals. In our setting,
ﬁrms cannot choose the nature of their advertising eﬀort, i.e. they cannot
determine how much market enlargment vs stealing eﬀect they can induce.
This is certainly an issue that deserves attention but which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Before proceeding further, we should mention that, in general, any
demand enhancing investment activity gives rise to complex issues regar-
ding the utility function from which the demand is derived. This is a well
known microfoundated problem that many models share. Another problem,
initially pointed out by Dixit and Norman (1978), arises when advertising
shifts the individual utility function from which the demand curve is deri-
ved. The usual criticism regarding the welfare comparison also applies to
the proﬁt comparisons that we will carry out in our model.
3 The proposed linear demand function is consistent with utility maximizing consumers with quadratic utility
functions (see Shubik and Levitan (1980)).
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The lower the degree of product diﬀerentiation (high values of c), the
higher the impact of this second eﬀect. In fact, as long as products are
perceived as highly substitutes, ﬁrms have a strong incentive to attach an
element of diﬀerentiation on their own good through advertising. In order
to capture the stealing eﬀect, we make the hypothesis that a ﬁrm doing
advertising receives a demand gain cα, while imposing at the same time an
equivalent demand cut −cα to its rival.4
Although our two ﬁrms are a priori identical, the game could admit
asymmetric equilibria. In particular, we have to account for the possibility
that ﬁrm i sets a price lower or equal to a limit price pli, pushing the other
ﬁrm (endogenously) out of the market. This clearly raises the problem of
deﬁning the demand received by the remaining ﬁrm. Starting from equation
(1), the solution that we adopt is to deﬁne demand in the limit pricing
domain in such a way that continuity is preserved for all admissible price
strategies. This leads to the following demand system :
qi(pi, p−i, Ii, I−i) =
{
max {a(Ii, I−i)− bpi + c[p−i − pi + αi(Ii)− α−i(I−i)], 0} , if pi > p
l
i
max {2a(Ii, I−i)− b pi − bϕ(pi), 0} , if pi  p
l
i
}
(2)
where :
Ii = {0, 1} for i = 1, 2
a(Ii, I−i) = a(Ii + I−i) =
{
a if Ii + I−i = 0
a+ γ if Ii + I−i = 1
a+ 3γ/2 if Ii + I−i = 2
αi =
{
0 if Ii = 0
α if Ii = 1
for i = 1, 2
ϕ(pi) = max
{
a(Ii + I−i) + c[α−i(I−i)− αi(Ii)]
b+ c
+
c
b+ c
pi, 0
}
a, b, α, γ, c > 0
The demand system (2) makes clear the limit pricing issue by con-
sidering the two alternatives that depend on ﬁrm i’ price decision. When
pi > p
l
i both ﬁrms are active on the market, while for pi  p
l
i only ﬁrm i
makes positive sales, being the rival driven out of the market. However, it is
important to stress that the requirements of continuity and non-negativity
of demands for all admissible prices leads to a ‘unique’ deﬁnition of demand
in the limit price domain.5
As for the diﬀerent components entering into demand system (2),
the binary variable Ii represents advertising strategies : ﬁrm i could either
4 A more realistic modelisation would require, for example, a loss for the rival equal to−θcα, with θ ∈ [0, 1].
However, this would burden the calculations with another parameter that does not add particular insight in
our analysis. The aim of this paper is in fact to stress the interaction between the two aformentioned effects
more than their exact effectiveness.
5 Further details on how demand function (2) is obtained from equation (1) as well as a complete discussion
on the continuity requirements are given in Appendix A.1.
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advertise (Ii = 1) or not (Ii = 0). The market enlargement eﬀect is captured
by a(I1, I2) and depends upon total investment : I1+I2. If no ﬁrm advertises,
then a(I1 + I2) is stuck to a basic level a. If only one ﬁrm advertises, then
a(I1+I2) increases to a+γ, while if the other does the same the new marginal
increase is just (1/2)γ. This series of (geometric) diminishing increments is
a simple way to model the fact that there cannot be unlimited expansion
of the market.6 We also tried alternative speciﬁcations for the decreasing
expansion of the market ﬁnding very similar results. The stealing eﬀect is
instead parameterized by αi, that could be either zero or α. If only one ﬁrm
advertises then, as long as the other one is actually on the market (pi > p
l
i),
its demand increases by cα while the demand of the rival decreases by
the same amount. As argued in the previous section, the magnitude of the
stealing eﬀect is in fact positively related to product substitutability. Indeed,
if two goods are perceived as very diﬀerent from each other, the capability
of advertising to shift demand from one ﬁrm to the other is very limited.
On the other hand, if prices and advertising strategies are such that only
ﬁrm i makes positive sales ( pi  p
l
i), its demand depends only on pi in such
a way that continuity in prices is guaranteed.
3 The second stage price game
In equilibrium, there can obviously be just two possibilities : either the two
ﬁrms sell a positive amount of goods, or just one of them receives a positive
demand while the other has a zero output. As we already pointed out, our
demand system (2) is continuous for all p1, p2 ∈ [0,∞) and it is clearly
monotone decreasing (increasing) in each ﬁrm own (cross) price whenever a
ﬁrm’s demand is positive. Anyway, ﬁrst-order conditions alone do not suﬃce
to characterize Nash Equilibria in the price game because demand functions
have kinks. In fact, demands are just piece-wise linear in both own and cross
price, and their slope changes in view of limit pricing. However, in Appendix
A.1 we show that this change is “well-behaved” in the sense that the slope
is lower (in absolute value) when only one ﬁrm sells on the market.
This change in price responsiveness comes from the fact that, when
both ﬁrms are active on the market, a price reduction by one ﬁrm induces
not only new customers to buy the product, but also usual clients of the
rival to drift to the price-reducing ﬁrm. This has a very useful implication
for ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions which, by linearity of demands and absence of va-
riable costs, turn out to be strictly concave whenever quantities are positive.
Therefore, we can state the following :
Claim 1 : If a NE in the second stage price game with both ﬁrms making
positive sales exists, then ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient
to identify it.
6 In particular, we adopt the geometric series a(n) = a + ∑ni 1i γ.
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3.1 Case A : None invests
We start by considering the symmetric case where no ﬁrm invests in adver-
tising. If both ﬁrms receive positive demands, then the demand curves of
each ﬁrm are (with I1 = I2 = 0) :
q1 = a− b p1 + c (p2 − p1) (3)
q2 = a− b p2 + c (p1 − p2).
Since we assume that marginal costs are zero, and there are no ﬁxed costs
in production, proﬁts are :
pi1 = p1q1 = p1 [a− b p1 + c (p2 − p1)] (4)
pi2 = p2q2 = p2 [a− b p2 + c (p1 − p2)] .
Proﬁts are quadratic in each ﬁrm’s own price, and by ﬁrst-order conditions
we get equilibrium prices :
pA1 = p
A
2 =
a
2b+ c
> 0. (5)
As one can see, the demands corresponding to these prices are always
positive and the equilibrium proﬁts (obtained using equilibrium prices pA1
and pA2 ) are :
piA1 = pi1(p
A
1 , p
A
2 ) = pi
A
2 = pi2(p
A
1 , p
A
2 ) =
a2(b+ c)
(2b+ c)2
> 0. (6)
According to Claim 1, the pair {pA1 , pA2 } thus represents the unique
“SPE” characterized by both ﬁrms making positive sales. On the other hand,
it is straightforward to check that each ﬁrm can always ﬁnd here, whatever
the other does, a strictly positive price such that it receives some demand
and makes strictly positive proﬁts. This clearly means that there is no room
for equilibria with just one active ﬁrm, i.e. :
Lemma 1 : In the subgame where no ﬁrm invests, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies given by {pA1 , pA2 }.
3.2 Case B : Only one firm invests
We now examine the case where only one ﬁrm invests in advertising. Wi-
thout loss of generality, we assume that ﬁrm 1 invests while ﬁrm 2 does
not : I1 = 1 and I2 = 0. In case of positive sales for both ﬁrms, the demand
curves are given by :
q1 = a+ γ − b p1 + c (p2 − p1 + α) (7)
q2 = a+ γ − b p2 + c (p1 − p2 − α).
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Compared to the previous case, where none of them invested in ad-
vertising, both ﬁrms enjoy here an increase in demand equal to γ due to
the market enlargement eﬀect. However, due to the stealing eﬀect, ﬁrm 1
receives an additional gain cα, while imposing a penalty −cα to the ri-
val. Intuitively, this stealing component allows ﬁrm 1 to increase its price
with respect to ﬁrm 2. Furthermore, if α is strong enough, the latter could
(eventually) be unable to get any market share. Proﬁts are given by :
pi1 = p1q1 − 1 = p1 [a+ γ − b p1 + c(p2 − p1 + α)]− 1 (8)
pi2 = p2q2 = p2 [a+ γ − b p2 + c (p1 − p2 − α)]
By ﬁrst-order conditions we get prices :
pB1Ac =
(a+ γ) (2b+ 3c) + cα(2b+ c)
(2b+ c) (2b+ 3c)
> 0 (9)
pB2Ac =
{
(a+ γ)(2b+ 3c)− cα(2b+ c)
(2b+ c)(2b+ 3c)
if α < αa
0 otherwise
(10)
where the subscript Ac indicates that both ﬁrms are active on the mar-
ket. One can easily check that qB2 (p
B
1Ac, p
B
2Ac) is positive iﬀ α < αa =
(2b+ 3c)(a+ γ)
(2b+ c)c
. Following Claim 1, when such a condition on α is sa-
tisﬁed, then the pair of strategies {pB1Ac, pB2Ac} that we have identiﬁed by
ﬁrst-order conditions is the unique NE characterized by both ﬁrms making
positive sales. Not surprisingly, the relative advantage of the investing ﬁrm
should be small enough (α < αa) in order to have both ﬁrms selling at
equilibrium. The associated equilibrium proﬁts are :
piB1Ac =
1
(2b+ c)2(2b+ 3c)2
(11){(
a2 + γ2
)
(b+ c)(2b+ 3c)2 + (2b+ c)2
[
c2α2(b+ c)− (2b+ 3c)2]+
+2(b+ c)(2b+ 3c) [cα(2b+ c) (γ + a) + aγ(2b+ 3c)]}
piB2Ac =
(b+ c) [(a+ γ) (2b+ 3c)− cα(2b+ c)]2
(2b+ c)2(2b+ 3c)2
. (12)
We should now turn to the study of equilibria characterized by just
one active ﬁrm. It is easy to check that only ﬁrm 1 can always ﬁnd, whate-
ver the other does, a strictly positive price such that it still receives some
demand. Therefore, the only possibility is that ﬁrm 2, which does not adver-
tise its product, ﬁnds itself out of business. Furthermore, we can prove that
(without loss of generality) one could simply focus on equilibria in which
p2 = 0 :
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Lemma 2 : Consider the subgame where just ﬁrm 1 invests. If {p∗1, p∗2} is
a NE with p∗1, p
∗
2 > 0 and q2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = 0, then also {p∗1, p2} is, for any
p2 ∈ [0, p∗2], a NE with q2(p∗1, p2) = 0. Furthermore, pi1(p∗1, p∗2) = pi1(p∗1, p2)
and pi2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) = pi2(p
∗
1, p2) = 0 for any such p2 ∈ [0, p∗2].
Proof. Suppose that {p∗1, p∗2} is a NE with p∗1, p∗2 > 0, and q2(p∗1, p∗2) = 0.
For p∗2 to be a best reply to p
∗
1, there should not exist any p2 > 0 such that
q2(p
∗
1, p2) > 0. By continuity of our demand system, this implies that also
q2(p
∗
1, 0) cannot be positive, and so all p2 ∈ [0, p∗2] are certainly best replies
to p∗1. On the other hand, for any p2 ∈ [0, p∗2], we have that q2(p∗1, p2) = 0
and so ﬁrm 1’s demand does not certainly depend on such p2 for prices
lower or equal than p∗1, i.e. q1(p1, p2) = q1(p1, p
∗
2) = q1(p1) ∀p1 ∈ [0, p∗1],
while for prices p1 ∈ (p∗1,∞) it satisﬁes the inequality q1(p1, p2)  q1(p1, p∗2)
that comes from the fact that demand is non-decreasing in the cross price.
Being p∗1 a best reply to p
∗
2 we have q1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)  q1(p1, p
∗
2) ∀p1, and using the
previous relations we obtain that, for any p2 ∈ [0, p∗2], q1(p∗1, p2)  q1(p1, p2)
∀p1 so that p∗1 is also a best reply to any such p2 and in particular to p2 = 0.
Lemma 2 means that, whenever ﬁrm 1 pushes the rival out of the
market, we are in the same situation (in terms of equilibrium price p1 and
payoﬀs) as if ﬁrm 2 charged a price equal to zero.
In order to study such equilibria we ﬁrst ﬁgure out how ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt
function looks like. Indicating with pB1Dt = α −
a+ γ
c
the limit price pl1
corresponding to p2 = 0 we have that, depending on its price p1, ﬁrm 1 may
ﬁnd itself in the domain in which both ﬁrms sell something (p1 > p
B
1Dt), or
in the domain in which it is the only active ﬁrm (p1  p
B
1Dt). As we already
know, the two domains correspond to diﬀerent analytical expressions of the
demand function.
If ﬁrm 1 prices above the limit price pB1Dt, its demand (for p2 = 0)
will be given by :
q1 = a+ γ − bp1 + c(−p1 + α) (13)
with proﬁts :
pi1 = p1q1 − 1 = p1 [a+ γ − bp1 + c (−p1 + α)]− 1. (14)
By ﬁrst-order conditions we get the unique maximum :
pˆB1 =
a+ γ + cα
2(b+ c)
. (15)
Nonetheless, this solution rests on the hypothesis that q2 > 0, which
has to be checked. If ﬁrm 1 instead prices below the limit price pB1Dt, it gets
a demand (for p2 = 0) and a proﬁt respectively given by :
q1 = 2(a+ γ)− bp1 (16)
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pi1 = p1q1 − 1 = p1 [2(a+ γ)− b p1]− 1. (17)
By ﬁrst-order conditions we obtain the unique maximum :
pB1Mp =
a+ γ
b
> 0. (18)
It is easy to check that, for α = αa, pˆ
B
1 = p
B
1Dt > 0 while, for α > αa
(α < αa), pˆ
B
1 is strictly lower (higher) than p
B
1Dt and they are still both
positive.
In case of α > αa, this means that for prices bigger than p
B
1Dt ( pˆ
B
1 ),
the “true” demand ﬁrm 1 faces is given by (13) and then proﬁts, given by
the concave parabola (14), are decreasing in this range of prices precisely
because we are to the right of pˆB1 . We can thus exclude all prices p1 > p
B
1Dt
from equilibrium. If ﬁrm 1 instead charges a price lower or equal than pB1Dt,
its “true” demand is given by (16), with relative proﬁts given by (17) which
is again a concave parabola in p1 with a unique maximum p
B
1Mp. There are
consequently 2 possible scenarios, represented respectively in Figures 1a and
Figure 1b, referring to ﬁrm 2 being out of the market :
• When αa  α < αb = (b+ c)(a+ γ)
bc
, we have pB1Mp > p
B
1Dt. Conse-
quently, for prices higher than pB1Dt, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt corresponds to the
decreasing branch of the parabola (14), while in the other case it corres-
ponds to the increasing branch of the parabola (17). The two parabolas
touch each other at p1 = p
B
1Dt, that is the unique maximum.
• When α  αb, we have pB1Mp  pB1Dt. Consequently, for prices higher
than pB1Dt ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt corresponds again to the decreasing branch of
the parabola (14), while in the other case it corresponds to the decreasing
branch of the parabola (17). The two parabolas touch each other at p1 =
pB1Dt, and the unique maximum is reached for p1 = p
B
1Mp.
Obviously, p2 = 0 is a best reply to limit prices p
B
1Dt and p
B
1Mp and so
all the conditions needed in order to have a Nash Equilibrium are satisﬁed.7
We can ﬁnally state the following :
Lemma 3 : in the subgame when only ﬁrm one invests, there is a “unique”
equilibrium (in terms of payoﬀs and price p1) in pure strategies given by
1.
{
pB1Ac, p
B
2Ac
}
when α < αa ;
2.
{
pB1Dt, 0
}
when αa  α < αb ;
3.
{
pB1Mp, 0
}
when α  αb.
7 For the sake of completeness, in case α < αa we have that for prices bigger than pB1Dt (< pˆB1 ), the
‘true’ demand firm 1 faces is still given by (13) but profits, represented by the concave parabola (14), are
increasing in this range of prices because we are now to the left of pˆB1 , which represents the unique
maximum. Consequently, as limit pricing is never a best strategy for firm 1, we can exclude equilibria with
only one active firm whenever α < αa.
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Figure 1a : Firm 1’s proﬁt function for αa < α  αb (bold line).
Figure 1b : Firm 1’s proﬁt function for α > αb (bold line).
Results of Lemma 3 are actually quite intuitive. If the stealing eﬀect
is suﬃciently small (α < αa), then both ﬁrms makes positive sales in equi-
librium. Anyway, beyond the critical value αa, the advertising ﬁrm ﬁnds
it convenient to charge a limit price such that its competitor is (endoge-
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nously) squeezed out of the market.8 In particular, if αa  α < αb then
ﬁrm 1 charges the highest limit price, while if the stealing eﬀect is really
strong (α  αb), ﬁrm 1 is able to take the all market by setting a kind of
“monopoly” price pB1Mp. It is interesting to note that each ﬁrm’s best reply
is continuous with respect to α (as well as with respect to the other para-
meters), and the same applies to equilibrium proﬁts, due to the continuity
of demand.
For future reference, we write the equilibrium proﬁts of ﬁrms in the
three subcases considered :
• α < αa =⇒ pB1 = pB1Ac, pB2 = pB2Ac and equilibrium proﬁts piB1 , piB2 are
given by (11) and (12);
• αa  α < αb =⇒ pB1 = pB1Dt, pB2 = 0 and equilibrium proﬁts are :
piB1 = pi
B
1Dt =
(αc− γ − a) [2c (a+ γ)− b (αc− γ − a)]
c2
− 1, (19)
piB2 = pi
B
2Dt = 0;
• α  αb =⇒ pB1 = pB1Mp, pB2 = 0 and equilibrium proﬁts are :
piB1 = pi
B
1Mp =
(a+ γ)2
b
− 1, (20)
piB2 = pi
B
2Mp = 0.
Obviously, due to the symmetric structure of the game, in the case
where only ﬁrm 2 invests in advertising, we obtain the reversed equilibrium
prices and payoﬀs.
3.3 Case C : Both firms invest
We ﬁnally consider the (symmetric) case where both ﬁrms decide to invests
in advertising. The demand curves of each ﬁrm are (with I1 = I2 = 1) :
q1 = a+
3
2
γ − b p1 + c (p2 − p1) (21)
q2 = a+
3
2
γ − b p2 + c (p1 − p2).
Now only the market enlargement eﬀect appears, while the strategic eﬀect
is reciprocally cancelled out by the investment of the two ﬁrms. Proﬁts are
8 Amir (2000) found conditions leading to endogenous exit in a two-period symmetric Cournot duopoly with
R&D returns to process innovation.
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given by :
pi1 = p1q1 = p1
[
a+
3
2
γ − b p1 + c(p2 − p1)
]
− 1 (22)
pi2 = p2q2 = p2
[
a+
3
2
γ − bp2 + c(p1 − p2)
]
− 1.
By ﬁrst-order conditions we get prices :
pC1 = p
C
2 =
2a+ 3γ
4b+ 2c
> 0 (23)
The corresponding demands are always positive and the equilibrium
proﬁts are :
piC1 = pi
C
2 =
(b+ c) (2a+ 3γ)2
4(2b+ c)2
− 1 (24)
Following again Claim 1, the pair {pC1 , pC2 } represents the unique sub-
game Nash equilibrium characterized by both ﬁrms making positive sales.
Furthermore, it is easy to check that we are here in the same situation as
for case A, and then :
Lemma 4 : In the subgame when both ﬁrm invest, there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies given by
{
pC1 , p
C
2
}
.
4 The advertising game
In the last section, we have dealt with the equilibria of the diﬀerent price
subgames. We have seen that, for every parameter value a unique (in term of
payoﬀs) NE exists.9 Now, given the binary nature of the advertising choice,
we can solve backward the ﬁrst stage with a simple 2x2 matrix containing
equilibrium payoﬀs from the second stage. Uniqueness in the latter payoﬀs
makes it possible to have a unique representation of this matrix, that we
show in Table 1 :
firm 2
firm 1
0 1
0 piA1 = pi
A
2 pi
B
2 pi
B
1
1 piB1 pi
B
2 pi
C
1 = pi
C
2
Table 1
9 From now on, if not elsewhere specified, we refer to uniqueness in terms of payoffs.
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We can ﬁrst remark that, due to the symmetric structure of the
payoﬀs, at least one “SPE” will always exist. Suppose, on the contrary,
that no “SPE” exists. For (0, 0) not to be a SPE we need piBi > pi
A
i . Assume
now that also (1, 1) is not a “SPE”, hence piB2 > pi
C
i . But when these two
inequalities on proﬁts hold simultaneously, then (1, 0) and (0, 1) are “SPE”
and this contradicts the claim that no “SPE” exists.
Before going into a detailed analysis of our “SPE”, we compare the
payoﬀs appearing in the principal diagonal. This will shed light on the Pa-
reto eﬃciency of the NE from ﬁrms’ standpoint as well as on the qualitative
nature of the game. One may easily check that
piCi  pi
A
i iﬀ γ  γ1, where γ1 =
2
3
[ √
a2(b+ c) + (2b+ c)2√
b+ c
− a
]
> 0. (25)
Obviously, both ﬁrms gain in investing when the enlargement of the market
due to advertising is big enough. In this case, the demand coming from new
consumers boosts ﬁrms’ demand and allows them to recoup their initial
investment. Interestingly, it may be the case that the two ﬁrms invest in
equilibrium while it would have been better not to invest, or the other way
round, thus giving rise to prisoner dilemma outcomes. This can be simply
assessed by means of parameter γ1, which will therefore play a fundamental
role throughout the following analysis.
The simple structure of the game is such that we can quite easily
characterize all possible situations. We can in fact encounter just four out-
comes. Omitting cases of weak inequalities, we know that (0, 0) is a “SPE”
iﬀ piAi > pi
B
1 , while (1, 1) is a “SPE” iﬀ pi
C
i > pi
B
2 , and thus combining the
two we get :
1. When only piAi > pi
B
1 holds, then (0, 0) is the unique “SPE” of the game.
The two ﬁrms do not invest in advertising and, depending on the value
of γ, we could possibly obtain a prisoner dilemma game.
2. When only piCi > pi
B
2 holds, then (1, 1) turns out to be the unique “SPE”
of the game. Again, depending on γ, we may have or not a prisoner
dilemma.
3. If both conditions hold together, we obtain a coordination game with two
“SPE” along the principal diagonal.
4. Lastly, if both these conditions are not satisﬁed, we get a chicken game
with two asymmetric “SPE” along the secondary diagonal characterized
by only one ﬁrm investing in advertising.
To link equilibrium proﬁts with the parameters of the model, we have
to consider three diﬀerent expressions associated to piB1 , depending on the
value taken by α. Bearing this in mind, we can give necessary and suﬃcient
conditions on (α, γ) for (0, 0) to be a “SPE” :
Proposition 1 (0, 0) is a “SPE” for suﬃciently low combinations between
the values of α and the ones of γ. In particular : (i) when α  αb, we need
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γ  γ2 ; (ii) when αa  α < αb, we need either γ  γ2 or, if γ > γ2,
then α  αc (< αb); (iii) when 0 < α < αa, we need either γ  γ3 (>
γ2) or, if γ > γ3, then α  αd (< αa). When γ  γ4 (> γ3), (0, 0) is
never an equilibrium, independently of α. Moreover, this Nash Equilibrium,
when it exists, turns out to be Pareto dominant from ﬁrms’ standpoint for
suﬃciently low values of γ (γ < γ1), otherwise the game is of a prisoner
dilemma type.
Proof see Appendix A.2.
Figure 2 : The equilibrium (0, 0)
The dashed area in Figure 2 indicates those values that sustain (0, 0)
as a “SPE” in the (α, γ) space.10 As one can see, both ﬁrms decide not
to invest when the combination of the market size eﬀect and the strategic
stealing eﬀect is weak enough. There is, indeed, a certain degree of substitu-
tion in the two eﬀects. A strong stealing gain α could be compensated with
a weakening of the market enlargement in order for (0, 0) to be a “SPE”.
However, for very high values of γ (γ  γ4), whatever α is, (0, 0) is never
a “SPE”. Furthermore, when it exists as an equilibrium, (0, 0) is Pareto
10 Figure 2 has been depicted using c = 1, b = 1, and a = 0.3.
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dominant for ﬁrms only when the market size eﬀect is suﬃciently weak, i.e.
when γ < γ1. As introduced above, Pareto eﬃciency is evaluated by the
parameter γ1, that compares the two symmetric outcomes of the game, pi
A
i
vs piCi .
Interestingly, a prisoner dilemma, indicated by the portion of the da-
shed area on the right of γ1, appears when the perspectives of market enlar-
gement are quite favorable, but the stealing gain is limited. One ﬁrm alone
has no advantage to invest in advertising since it does not steal that much
from the other ﬁrm which, by contrast, would enjoy from the expansion of
the market without paying any cost for it. Although ﬁrms would be better
oﬀ by both investing and enlarge substantially the market, they refrain from
doing so.
Let us now consider the equilibrium (1, 1). By evaluating piCi vs pi
B
2 ,
and taking into account the restrictions on both proﬁt functions, we can
conclude that in the parameter space (α, γ) :
Proposition 2 (1, 1) is a “SPE” for suﬃciently high combinations between
the values of α and those of γ. In particular, we need at least that γ  γ5
and either α  αa, or, when α < αa, α  αe (< αa). When γ  γ5, (1, 1) is
never an equilibrium, independently of α. On the contrary, if γ  γ6 (> γ5),
(1, 1) is always a “SPE”. Such a solution represents a Pareto dominant
strategy for ﬁrms for suﬃciently high values of γ (γ > γ1), otherwise it
gives rise to a prisoner dilemma.
Proof see Appendix A.3.
The dotted area in Figure 3 describes the equilibrium conditions in
the (α, γ) space.11 Contrary to before, both ﬁrms invest in equilibrium when
the combination of the two eﬀects is strong enough. There is, again, a cer-
tain degree of substitution between α and γ. When the stealing eﬀect is
weak, (1, 1) constitutes a “SPE” of the game only if the market expansion
translates into a considerable increase in ﬁrms’ proﬁts. However, if γ is big
enough (γ > γ6), then, whatever is α, (1, 1) is always a “SPE”.
Turning to Pareto eﬃciency and evaluating piCi vs pi
A
i , from (25) we
know that (1, 1) is Pareto dominant from ﬁrms’ standpoint only whenever
γ > γ1. On the contrary, a prisoner dilemma situation arises when γ < γ1
and it is indicated in Figure 3 by the portion of the dotted area on the
left of γ1. Its nature is the mirror image of the one found in the previous
case, given that it implies a suﬃciently strong stealing gain. Even if both
ﬁrms would be better oﬀ without doing advertising because the market
expansions possibilities are quite limited (γ < γ1), they decide to advertise
at equilibrium because they are fully aware of the substantial gain (loss) of
being the only advertising (non-advertising) ﬁrm.
Combining Proposition 1 and 2, we can fully characterize the four pos-
sible outcomes of the model in terms of the parameters. In the next section
11 Figure 3 has also been drawn using c = 1, b = 1, and a = 0.3.
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Figure 3 : The equilibrium (1, 1)
we will give some insights on how these equilibria conﬁgurations react to
changes in parameters as well as their underlying economic interpretation.
5 Further results and economic interpretations
In the previous section we gave necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the
two-dimensional parametric space (α, γ) such that (0, 0) and (1, 1) are
“SPE”. Following Propositions 1 and 2, we reasonably expect to ﬁnd that,
when there are small incentives for ﬁrms to advertise (i.e. low values of α
and γ), (0, 0) is the only equilibrium of the game. By contrast, for suﬃ-
ciently high values of α and γ, we expect (1, 1) to be the only outcome.
Now, what is not clear is what happens in intermediate situations. Both a
coordination and a chicken game will be possible, but conditions leading to
each outcome still remain unknown at this stage.
In order to shed some light on the forces underpinning the game, we
resort to comparative statics analysis. This task turns out to be extremely
diﬃcult because equilibria are characterized in the two-dimensional space
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(α, γ) and we need to consider simultaneously all the diﬀerent threshold
values appearing in Propositions 1 and 2. Let for the moment focus on
parameter γ : threshold values γ2, γ3 and γ4 serve to identify the relative
position of the α curves that deﬁne the region where (0, 0) is an equilibrium
of the game, while γ5 and γ6 play an analogous role for the α curves that de-
termine equilibrium (1, 1). Lastly, remind that γ1 speciﬁes Pareto eﬃciency.
Hence, the ranking of such threshold values of γ allows for a complete cha-
racterization of the equilibria of the game. After tedious calculations, one
can show that :
γ6 > γ1 > γ5 and γ4 > γ1 > γ3 > γ2. (26)
Unfortunately, we cannot directly order γ6 vs γ4 and γ5 vs γ3, but
we use the initial size of the market, parameterized by a, to discriminate
between such threshold values of γ. In particular, depending on the relative
position of a with respect to two critical values a1 and a2 (with 0 < a1 < a2),
three diﬀerent situations will appear : 12
1. a < a1 =⇒ γ4 > γ6 > γ1 > γ5 > γ3 > γ2 > 0;
2. a1 < a < a2 =⇒ γ6 > γ4 > γ1 > γ5 > γ3 > γ2 > 0;
3. a2 < a =⇒ γ6 > γ4 > γ1 > 0 > γ5, γ2, γ3.
Figure 4 describes the whole situation in the ﬁrst case (i.e. a < a1)
13.
We can now clearly identify both a chicken game and a coordination game.
In the white area, neither the conditions of Proposition 1 nor those of Pro-
position 2 hold, and so (1, 0) and (0, 1) are the (unique) equilibria. This
scenario appears when the possibility of enlarging the market is neither too
limited nor too excessive (otherwise either (0, 0) or (1, 1) would respecti-
vely be the only outcomes), and the strategic stealing gain is suﬃcient for
the investing ﬁrm to proﬁtably cover the investment costs. Moreover, as we
know from Lemma 3, if α < αa, then the ﬁrm which is not investing is still
selling a positive amount of product, while for α > αa it is endogenously
driven out of the market. In particular, when αa  α < αb the investing
ﬁrm ﬁnds it convenient to set a limit price, while above αb it has such a big
advantage that it can charge a kind of monopoly price.
On the other hand, where the dotted and dashed areas overlap, we
have an interesting coordination game. Both (0, 0) and (1, 1) can be simul-
taneously equilibria and this happens again for intermediate values of γ,
but now coupled with a weak strategic eﬀect. When α is small, a ﬁrm that
invests alone must bear all costs of advertising, while its gain comes almost
entirely from the enlargement of the market. At the same time, the other
ﬁrm gains more or less the same, without paying anything for it. If the
return on advertising is quite good (in terms of γ), then the non-investing
ﬁrm could ﬁnd it proﬁtable to devote resources to adverting too. On the
12 Calculations available upon request.
13 Figure 4 merges figures 2 and 3. It has in fact been drawn using c = 1, b = 1, and a = 0.3 < a1 = 0.43.
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Figure 4 : Analysis of equilibria : Case 1
contrary, if this return is not too high, then the other ﬁrm can reasonably
reconsider its investment decision. Therefore, for intermediate values of γ
and low α, both kinds of deviations are plausible and we have a problem of
coordination. Interestingly, as the ﬁgure shows, when such a problem arises
the Pareto optimal equilibrium for our ﬁrms is the one with investment.
Figure 5 and 6 depict respectively the all set of equilibrium conditions
for the cases where a1 < a < a2 and a2 < a.
14 There are two main diﬀerences
with respect to Figure 4. First, the dashed area shrinks indicating that the
equilibrium (0, 0) is less and less likely to occur. This is due to the fact
that, when the initial size of the market a increases, then ﬁrms are, ceteris
paribus, more capable to cover the ﬁxed costs of advertising. This reasonably
makes ﬁrms more willing to invest in advertising. Second, the coordination
game disappears. This happens for the same reasons that cause the dashed
area to reduce. Rising a, it is less likely that a ﬁrm cannot cover the ﬁxed
cost of advertising, even if it invests alone.
Further intuitions could be drawn by the relative dimension of c, the
parameter which measures the degree of substitutability between the pro-
14 Figure 5 and 6 have been drawn still taking c = 1, and b = 1, but while the former refers to a = 1 (which is
in between a1 = 0.43 and a2 = 2.12), the latter uses a = 2.5 > a2 = 2.12.
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Figure 5 : Analysis of equilibria : Case 2 Figure 6 : Analysis of equilibria : Case 3
ducts of the two ﬁrms.15 For high values of c, we end up in a situation like
the one depicted in Figure 4 where, as we pointed out so far, the dashed
area expands while the dotted one shrinks with respect to Figures 5 and
6. In other words ﬁrms are, everything else equal, more reluctant to invest.
Intuitively, when products are close substitutes (high c), then competition
in prices turns out to be very ﬁerce. Consequently, equilibrium proﬁts de-
crease (and at the limit they tend to zero) and ﬁrms are then less willing to
advertise given that such an activity requires a ﬁxed cost. This behavior is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) inter alia.
Turning to the asymmetric situation where just one ﬁrm advertises,
the net eﬀect of a change in c is instead quite ambiguous. Indeed, the im-
pact of the strategic eﬀect on demands, given in equation (2) by cα, would
be stronger, giving a relative advantage to the investing ﬁrm. On the other
hand, the increase in competition in the goods market lowers proﬁts, dam-
pening the incentive to advertise. Consequently, the size of the white area
may either increase or decrease. In our simulations, it actually increases
from Figure 6 to 5, while decreasing when moving from 5 to 4. Put it diﬀe-
rently, as products become more diﬀerentiated, it is not necessarily the case
that a ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to invest in advertising if the other does not.
Taking into account asymmetric outcomes thus leads to discover this some-
how counter-intuitive relation between the equilibrium level of advertising
and the degree of product diﬀerentiation. A similar ambiguous relation has
been highlighted, although in a diﬀerent framework, by von der Fehr and
Stevik (1998).
15 In fact, we can alternatively review the ranking of the γ ’s in term of c. As a function of c, both a1 and a2
vary from values close to zero to infinity and their first derivatives are strictly positive. Therefore, for a given
a, we can always find values of c sufficiently high to have a < a1, and then decreasing c we pass to the
other two situations a1 < a < a2 and a2 < a.
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Finally, coming back to the coordination game, we can observe that
it arises only for high values of c (Figure 4). In other words, coordination
becomes an issue when the degree of interdependence among agents, captu-
red here by price competition, is strong enough. This indeed conforms with
intuition, but we can further prove that in such a case investing is the best
choice :
Proposition 3 The coordination game could arise only for low values of
a (a < a1) or, equivalently, when product are highly substitutes (big c).
Furthermore, when both (0, 0) and (1, 1) are “SPE”, then the latter is always
Pareto dominant from ﬁrms’ standpoint.
Proof see Appendix A.4.
The latter result may be interpreted in terms of externalities. The po-
sitive eﬀect of market enlargement is not fully internalized by an investing
ﬁrm because it spills over into the other ﬁrm’s demand. Therefore, equilibria
may be characterized by underinvestment in advertising. This is actually the
case of (0, 0) in our coordination game. On the other hand, for a coordina-
tion problem to arise we need a weak strategic eﬀect (low α), otherwise it
would always be convenient to advertise. Consequently, the ﬁrst externality
dominates the latter leaving room for equilibria in which ﬁrms refrain from
investing even if it is not a Pareto optimal choice.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we considered a two-stage duopoly model with diﬀerentiated
products where ﬁrms decide whether to invest in advertising or not and then
they compete in prices. Contrary to the standard approach of considering
advertising as either cooperative or predatory, we dealt with two opposite
eﬀects : a market enlargement and a stealing eﬀect. This separation allows
to better understand the forces underpinning the game, as well as to cha-
racterize in a richer way its equilibria. Particular attention has been paid
to the speciﬁc role of product diﬀerentiation in advertising decisions as well
as to the assessment of their Pareto optimality from ﬁrms’ standpoint.
Depending on the values taken by the parameters, both symmetric and
asymmetric equilibria appear. Among them, two outcomes are of particular
interest : a coordination game in which both investing and non-investing are
simultaneously equilibria; a chicken game in which only one ﬁrm invests in
equilibrium with the second one possibly driven (endogenously) out of the
market.
The coordination game arises only when products are strongly sub-
stitutes, suggesting that coordination matters when the degree of interde-
pendence among agents, captured by price competition, is suﬃciently high.
Interestingly, when such a problem of coordination appears, the investment
strategy leads in our model to the Pareto optimum.
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Turning to the chicken game, we actually found two very interesting
results. First, there exists a parameter region that supports a limit pricing
behavior by the investor with the rival being endogenously squeezed out of
the market. Furthermore, if the stealing advantage for the investing ﬁrm
is strong enough, then it is able to take the entire market just by setting
a kind of monopoly price. Second, in this asymmetric case the impact of
product substitutability on the advertising eﬀorts is ambiguous. This result
contradicts the common view of a positive relationship between product
diﬀerentiation and the equilibrium level of advertising and comes from the
interplay between two opposite forces at work in the asymmetric equili-
brium : the stealing gain that depends negatively on diﬀerentiation, and the
strength of price competition that is instead relaxed by a decrease in product
substitutability.
Starting from a very simple framework, we obtained quite interesting
results. However, one of the main limitations of our approach stands in the
use of a binary strategy set for investment decisions. Ideally, it would be
better to use a more sophisticated relationship between investment in ad-
vertising and demand changes. On the other hand, as many other forms of
investment, advertising has a strong discrete nature in the sense that it is
sometimes more important to decide whether to invest or not rather than
the exact amount to be spent on it. Furthermore, our plain structure turns
out to be extremely ﬂexible in the sense that it allows us to treat a large
number of parameters (without resorting to normalization) and to comple-
tely characterize the game. However, it is true that asymmetric outcomes
(represented by our chicken game) would have probably not occurred in a
continuous framework. Nevertheless, if one thinks of advertising eﬀort as
having increasing returns for small investments, which does not sound as an
implausible hypothesis, the asymmetric equilibria may reappear.
The same forces at work in the present paper could also be translated
into a dynamic setting. Every ﬁrm could in fact be endowed with a stock
of advertising that summarizes the eﬀects of past advertising eﬀorts. As a
consequence, apart form current advertising, both the enlargement of the
market and the consumers’ shift from one ﬁrm to the other would depend
on the stock of accumulated goodwill.
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A Appendix
A.1 The demand structure
Consider demand functions qi and q−i as given by equation (1). This ana-
lytic formulation is clearly meaningful as long as price strategies are such
that the implied qi and q−i are non-negative. Our goal here is to show
how the demand system (2) can be obtained from equation (1) using con-
tinuity arguments. In the limit case in which pi and p−i are such that
q−i, as computed from (1), exactly equals zero, solving the equation q−i =
a (Ii, I−i)−bp−i+c [pi − p−i + α−i (I−i)− αi (Ii)] = 0 for p−i and plugging
the solution into the equation of qi one gets (after rearranging terms) :
qi = 2a(Ii, I−i)− b pi − bϕ(pi) (A1)
which is precisely the demand of ﬁrm i when the other ﬁrm gets zero sales
(pi  p
l
i). Equation (A1) is certainly correct for any couple of prices pi and
p−i such that q−i = 0 in (1). What remains to prove is that this holds for
all prices pi and p−i that drive ﬁrm −i out of the market, i.e. for lower
pi and/or greater p−i. Consider for example a higher p−i. Since ﬁrm −i is
already out of the market, it cannot ameliorate its position by increasing
the price. Demands should thus be invariant to such increase in p−i and, by
continuity, qi equals (A1), which is in fact a function of pi only. On the other
hand, if ﬁrm i charged a lower price, ﬁrm −i would again stay out of the
market, and we would have q−i < 0 in (1). Following the above reasoning,
demand of ﬁrm i should not depend on p−i, as long as q−i computed with
(1) is non-positive. Everything thus works as if ﬁrm −i charged a new price
p−i that would make q−i exactly equal to zero, leading back to formulation
(A1). Finally, since the price p−i that solves q−i = 0 cannot be negative, we
have ϕ(pi) = max
{
a(Ii + I−i) + c[α−i(I−i)− αi(Ii)]
b+ c
+
c
b+ c
pi, 0
}
.
Let us now turn to price responsiveness of demand system (2). As long
as ﬁrm −i is active on the market, the appropriate demand curve is qi =
a(Ii, I−i)−bpi+c[p−i−pi+αi(Ii)−α−i(I−i)] and its derivative with respect
to pi is simply −(b+c). If price pi goes below the limit price pli, the demand
function becomes (A1) and its slope can be either − b(b+ 2c)
b+ c
> −(b + c)
or −b > − b(b+ 2c)
b+ c
, if pi is low enough to hit the constrain ϕ(pi) = 0. As
a conclusion, when pi decreases demand qi becomes less and less sensitive
to price changes.
Finally, the limit price pli is simply the non-negative solution (if it
exist) to equation q−i = a(Ii, I−i)−bp−i+c[pi−p−i+α−i(I−i)−αi(Ii)] = 0
with respect to pi :
pli = αi(Ii)− α−i(I−i) +
− a(Ii, I−i) + (b+ c)p−i
c
. (A2)
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It is worth noting that it depends on p−i (as expected) and, more important,
that it can be negative, meaning that a limit price does not always exist.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for (0, 0) to be an equilibrium is
that none of the two ﬁrms has an incentive to advertise alone. The proﬁt
accruing to both ﬁrms in case of no investments (I1 = I2 = 0) is given by
(6). By symmetry, we can consider indiﬀerently the deviation of one of the
two ﬁrms. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates (I1 = 1) and invests in advertising;
its equilibrium proﬁts in the second stage price game is that of case B. As
we have seen, although this payoﬀ is (for each and every given value of the
parameters) unique, its analytic expression changes in the parameters space.
In fact, proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is given by : (i) piB1Ac when α < αa, (ii) pi
B
1Dt when
αa  α < αb and (iii) pi
B
1Mp when α  αb. For each of the three cases we
have to compare the proﬁt that ﬁrm 1 gets when invests with the one that
it gets without investing in advertising. As long as the latter is greater or
equal to the former, (0, 0) will be a “SPE” of the reduced form of the game.
We begin with the case where α  αb and compare pi
A
1 with pi
B
1Mp as
they respectively appear in (6) and (20). As long as piA1  pi
B
1Mp, (0, 0) will
be an equilibrium. The equation piB1Mp − piA1 = 0 is a convex parabola in γ
with a negative (uninteresting) real root and a possibly positive real one :
γ2 =
√
b+
√
a2(b+ c) + (2b+ c)2
2b+ c
− a. (A3)
Therefore, since γ ∈ (0,∞), the necessary and suﬃcient condition we need
is simply γ  γ2. Clearly, if γ2 is negative, there is no acceptable value of γ
that makes (0, 0) an equilibrium in such a case (α  αb).
The second situation is characterized by αa  α < αb, where the
relevant equilibrium proﬁt to be compared with piA1 is given by pi
B
1Dt, whose
analytic expression is given by (19). Contrary to before, piB1Dt now depends
on α, reﬂecting the fact that ﬁrm 1 is not a “real” monopolist anymore
and it has to charge a limit price. This explains why ﬁrm 1 is still sensitive
to the extent of the “strategic eﬀect” α. The equation piB1Dt − piA1 = 0 is
a concave parabola in α with two roots. When γ < γ2 the two roots are
complex conjugate and (0, 0) is an equilibrium because piB1Dt − piA1 < 0 for
any α. When γ  γ2 the two roots are real; in particular, they both coincide
with αb for γ = γ2 (this is consistent with the ﬁndings of the previous case
where α  αb). As we deal with a concave parabola, we are interested in the
external solutions of the equation piB1Dt − piA1 = 0 that are compatible with
the interval of analysis (αa  α < αb). Since the diﬀerence between one of
these roots and αb is increasing in γ (as revealed by the sign of the ﬁrst
derivative) we can neglect it because, whenever this root is a real number
(γ  γ2), it is greater or equal to αb and then it lays outside the interval.
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The other (smaller) root is given by :
αc =
1
b
[
(b + c)(a + γ)
c
−
√
a2(3b2 + 3bc + c2) + 2a(2b + c)2γ − (2b + c)2(b− γ2)
2b + c
]
,
(A4)
which is decreasing in γ and meets αa in :
γ3 =
√
a2(b+ c) + (2b+ c)2
2
√
b+ c
− a. (A5)
It is immediate to verify γ3 > γ2. As a consequence, for γ  γ2 the condition
piB1Dt − piA1  0 is equivalent to α  αc.
Finally, when 0 < α < αa we have to compare the usual pi
A
1 with
piB1Ac as it appears in (11). The proﬁt diﬀerence pi
B
1Ac − piA1 = 0 is in this
case a convex parabola in α with a negative (uninteresting) real root and
a (possibly) positive real one, which is always greater than the other, given
by :
αd =
(2b+ 3c)
[√
b+ c
√
a2(b+ c) + (2b+ c)2 − (b+ c)(a+ γ)
]
c(b+ c)(2b+ c)
. (A6)
We look for internal solutions that are compatible with the interval of ana-
lysis (0 < α < αa). It is easy to check that αd is decreasing in γ and that
αd = αa when γ = γ3. Consequently, when γ  γ3, all α ∈ (0, αa) are
solutions to the inequality piB1Ac−piA1  0 and so (0, 0) is certainly an equili-
brium. On the other hand, when γ > γ3, then αd < αa and we need α  αd
for a deviation to be unproﬁtable. Furthermore, αd = 0 in γ = γ4, where :
γ4 =
√
a2(b+ c) + (2b+ c)2√
b+ c
− a. (A7)
Since γ4 > γ3, we have that (0, 0) cannot be an equilibrium for γ  γ4
because it does not exist a positive internal solution in α for piB1Ac−piA1 = 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for (1, 1) to be an equilibrium requires
that each ﬁrm takes no advantage in reconsidering its investment decision.
Whenever both ﬁrms invest in advertising (I1 = I2 = 1), proﬁts are simply
equal to piC1 = pi
C
2 as in (24) and they are non-negative iﬀ γ  γ5, with
γ5 =
2
3
(
2b+ c√
b+ c
− a
)
. (A8)
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Imagine that ﬁrm 2 deviates (I2 = 0); its equilibrium proﬁt in the
second stage price game is that of case B. As we have seen, although such
payoﬀ is unique, its analytic expression changes in the parameters space.
Nonetheless, in the present case we are left with two scenarios and the proﬁt
of ﬁrm 2 amounts to : (i) piB2Ac when 0 < α < αa ; (ii) zero when α  αa (for
both αa  α < αb and α  αb ﬁrm 2 gets zero proﬁts).
Let us begin with α  αa, where we just need to compare pi
C
2 with
piB2 = 0. The equilibrium condition pi
C
2  pi
B
2 only requires that pi
C
2 is non-
negative and we already know that this holds when γ  γ5.
The other case, where 0 < α < αa, turns out to be more cumbersome.
Relevant proﬁts are given by piB2Ac as in (12), which is now a strictly positive
number, and piC2 . The equation pi
B
2Ac − piC2 = 0 is a convex parabola in α
with two roots. When γ < γ5 the two roots are complex conjugate and
(1, 1) is never an equilibrium because piB2Ac − piC2 > 0 for any α. On the
contrary, when γ  γ5 the two roots are real and they both coincide with
αa for γ = γ5 (consistently with the ﬁndings of the case where α  αa).
As we consider a convex parabola, we look for internal solutions of the
equation piB2Ac−piC2 = 0 which are compatible with the interval under study
(0 < α < αa). A close inspection at the ﬁrst derivative (with respect γ) of
the diﬀerence between one of these root and αa reveals that such derivative
is positive as long as γ  γ5, so that we can neglect it : whenever this root
is a real number (γ  γ5), it is greater or equal to αa and so out of the
interval we are analyzing. The other (smaller) root is :
αe =
1
2c2(b+ c)(2b+ c)2
{2c(b+ c)(2b+ c)(2b+ 3c)(a+ γ)+ (A9)
−
√
c2(b+ c)(2b+ c)2(2b+ 3c)2 [4a2(b+ c)− 4(2b+ c)2 + 12a(b+ c)γ + 9(b+ c)γ2]
}
,
Notice that the quantity αe−αa is decreasing in γ ; in particular, αe reaches
0 for γ = γ6, where :
γ6 =
2
5
( √
a2(b+ c) + 5(2b+ c)2√
b+ c
− a
)
. (A10)
It is easy to verify that γ6 > γ5. As a consequence, the equilibrium con-
dition piB2Ac − piC2  0 is satisﬁed by the (internal) solution α  αe. In
particular, when γ  γ6, then (1, 1) is always an equilibrium because no
positive internal solution α exists for the equation piB2Ac − piC2 = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the case a < a1, that entails the ranking : 0 < γ2 < γ3 < γ5 <
γ1 < γ6 < γ4. Starting from 0 < γ < γ5, we know from Proposition 2
that (1, 1) will never be a “SPE”. We rule out this situation given that
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
LS
E 
-  
 - 
15
8.
14
3.
19
7.
75
 - 
22
/0
5/
20
12
 1
0h
57
. ©
 D
e 
Bo
ec
k 
Un
ive
rs
ité
 
D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - LSE -   - 158.143.197.75 - 22/05/2012 10h57. © De Boeck Université   
Andrea Mantovani, Giordano Mion 45
we look for intervals where both (0, 0) and (1, 1) hold simultaneously as
equilibria of the game. In γ5 < γ < γ4 the outcome (0, 0) is a “SPE” if
α  αd (see Proposition 1), while (1, 1) requires α  αe (see Proposition
2). Moreover, from Appendix A.2 we know that : (i) both αd and αe are
decreasing functions of γ ; (ii) αd starts from γ = γ3 and reaches 0 in γ = γ4,
while αe starts from γ = γ5 and reaches 0 in γ = γ6. Given the above
ranking of γ, it immediately follows that the two curves cross. In particular,
it is possible to demonstrate that they meet twice. However, one of these
two roots can be disregarded because it implies negative values for the
parameter α and it is then economically meaningless. In the admissible
region of parameters, thus, αd meets αe only in γ = γ7, where
γ7 =
1
7(b+ c)3/2
{
8(b+ c)
√
a2(b+ c) + (2b+ c)2 − 10a2(b+ c)3/2+ (A11)
− 2
√
(b+ c)2
[
13a2(b+ c) + 2(2b+ c)2 − 12a
√
(b+ c) [a2(b+ c) + (2b+ c)2]
]}
.
We can easily rank also this last threshold value of γ and we ﬁnd that
γ1 < γ7 < γ6. Hence, αe > αd for γ5 < γ < γ7 and αe < αd for γ7 < γ < γ4,
as we can see in Figure 4. It follows that a coordination game appears when
both γ7 < γ < γ4 and αe < α < αd. In the remaining interval, i.e. in γ4 < γ,
only (1, 1) can be a “SPE” given that we know from Proposition 1 that
(0, 0) is never an equilibrium of the game.
To complete our demonstration we need to prove that the coordination
game does not emerge when we consider higher values of a, i.e a1 < a. Let us
ﬁrst examine the case where a1 < a < a2. The main variation with respect
to the previous case is that γ4 < γ6. In the two “lateral” intervals, 0 <
γ < γ5 and γ4 < γ, a coordination game will never arise, exactly as before.
Furthermore, when we consider the “intermediate” interval γ5 < γ < γ4, we
see that αd and αe do not cross anymore, at least in the admissible region
of parameters. This is obvious given that γ4 and γ6 are inversely positioned
with respect to the previous situation. When the two curves exist, αe > αd
for every given value of γ, as we can see in Figure 5. It is not possible thus
to ﬁnd a region where α > αe and α < αd and, in turn, to sustain at the
same time (0, 0) and (1, 1) as “SPE”. The same reasoning applies to the
interval in which a2 < a, with the only diﬀerence that αd and αe are only
partly represented given that they start from negative values of γ, as one
can ﬁnd in Figure 6.
We have then proved the ﬁrst part of Proposition 3, showing that
a coordination game only appears for a < a1. In particular, this happens
when γ7 < γ < γ4 and αe < α < αd. The second part of Proposition 3
can be easily demonstrated given that (1, 1) and (0, 0) are both “SPE” only
for γ7 < γ < γ4 and we proved before that γ1 < γ7. Remembering that the
threshold value for Pareto eﬃciency is γ1 (see 25), a coordination game may
emerge only in the region where (1, 1) Pareto dominates (0, 0).
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The last part of this proof deals with the possibility of using c instead
of a to discern the case where the coordination game could arise. Unfortu-
nately, a complete characterization of the game is not obtainable because
we cannot ﬁnd values of c that rank the threshold values of γ. We consider
then the limit values for γ4 and γ6 when c going to inﬁnity. The former goes
to inﬁnity, while the latter tends to a ﬁnite number. For high values of c, it
becomes clear that γ4 > γ6 and we come back to the situation where αd and
αe cross, giving thus rise to the possibility that a coordination game exists.
Moreover, it is easy to prove that
∂a1
∂c
> 0 and
∂a2
∂c
> 0. Hence, when c
increases, it is more likely that we ﬁnd ourselves in a < a1, the region where
the coordination game may come out.
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